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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by §78-2-2(j)
Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are three issues presented for review in this case.
(1)

Does the three (3) month period of limitation

by Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 bar the plaintiff,
Financial Services' complaint

provided

Associates

in the court below?

The standard of appellate review is a correction of error
standard.
evidence,

The

court

including

construes

the

reasonable

facts

and

inferences,

views

in

a

judgment

is granted

is free to reappraise

legal

Oberhansly

v.

most

judgment.

as a matter of law rather

than fact, the court
conclusions.

the

light

favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
Because summary

all

the trial

Sprouse,

751

Services,

as

P.

court's
2d

1155,

1156 (Utah App. 1988)
2.
junior

Was

Associates

lienholder

Financial

at the senior

lienholder's

a

purchasing

sale, subject

to

the "fair value" limitations imposed by Utah Code Annotated
§57-1-32 which

limits

recovery

to the

difference

between

indebtedness due and the fair market value of the property
the date of the trustee's

sale?
-1-

the
on

The standard of appellate review
standard.

is a correction

The reviewing court need

give

no

of error

deference

to

the

trial court's conclusions of law but reviews them for correctness.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) ; RonCase

Roofing and Asphalt

Paving,

Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P. 2d

1382

(Utah 1989)
3.

Is

junior

Associates

lienholder

foreclosure

sale,

at

Financial
the

Services,

senior

precluded

by

as

a

lienholder's

the

purchasing
non-judicial

"one-action

rule"

from

bringing a subsequent action against the debtors on the promissory
note?
The standard of appellate review is a correction of error
standard.

Madsen v. Borthick, supra.
THE GOVERNING

AUTHORITIES

The statutory provisions on which this appeal

is primarily

based are Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 and § 7 8 - 3 7 - 1 .

that

Utah

Code

an

action

Annotated
may

be

§57-1-32

provides

commenced

to

in

recover

pertinent
the

part

balance

due

upon the obligation for which a trust deed was given as security
within

three

(3)

months

sale of the property.

after

the

This statute

non-judicial
is set

forth

foreclosure
verbatim

in

the Addendum.
Utah Code Annotated
only

one

action

by a mortgage

§78-37-1

for the recovery

upon

real

estate.
-2-

specifies
of

any

This

that

debt

there

secured

provision

has

can

be

solely
come

to

be known

as the

"one-action

rule."

The text

of the

statute

is reproduced in the Addendum.
Title
Code

26

United

§2410(d),

and

States
26

Code

Code

of

§7425(d),
Federal

28

United

Regulations

States
§400.5-1

dictate the procedures to be followed by the Internal
Service

or

the

United

States

in

real

actions where the property

is subject

the

States.

I.R.S.

those

or

the

statutory

United

provisions

and

property
to a lien

foreclosure
in favor

of

provisions

of

are reproduced

in

Pertinent

regulations

Revenue

the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

defendants-appellants

D. Slaugh
which

seek

awarded

reversal

Franklin

of a summary

the appellee, Associates

L.

Slaugh

judgment

and

Cheryl

entered

Financial

below

Services, a

judgment against the defendants on a promissory note originally
secured by a trust

deed

on real

property.

[R. 157-1583

The

District Court Judge had previously denied a motion for summary
judgment filed by the Slaughs [R. 91] and the lender, Associates,
thereafter

filed

a motion

for

100-101]

After

hearing

oral

partial

summary

argument,

the

judgment.
District

[R.

Judge

issued his Memorandum Decision [R. 147-149] ruling that plaintiff was entitled

to judgment

against

the

defendants

in

the

sum of $26,089.71, plus interest and minus any legal offsets.
-3-

The District

Court

subsequently

entered

Findings

and Conclusions of Law [R. 152-156] and an Order and

of

Fact

Judgment

[R. 157-158] from which the defendants appeal.
The facts relevant to the issues presented

for review are

as follows:
(a)

On or about November 26, 1982 the defendants

L. Slaugh and Cheryl

D. Slaugh

with

Associates

the

plaintiff,

entered

into

Financial

a loan

Franklin
agreement

Services,

wherein

the Slaughs executed a promissory note in favor of the plaintiff
in the sum of $33,104.14. [R.152-153 Us 1-2]
(b)
real

The

promissory

property

owned

Lake County, Utah.

note was

by

the

secured

defendants

by
and

located

in

senior

proceeding

by the senior trust
lienholder

and

deed

commenced

conducted

a

a

on

of

[R. 153 1F4]
defaulted

said

real

non-judicial

trustee's

on

Salt

in priority

Prior to February, 1989, the Slaughs

note secured
The

deed

This trust deed was second

recording as a lien on that real property.
(c)

a trust

sale

as

on a

property.

foreclosure
the

the

real

property on February 28, 1989. [R. 153 117]
(d)
note

The Slaughs

owing

to

were

Associates

not

in

default

Financial

on

Services

the
at

promissory

the

time

of

the trustee's sale. [R. 153 1F6]
(e)
ducted

Associates
with

respect

Financial
to

Services

Slaughs'

1989 which valued the property

real

had

an appraisal

property

in

February,

at $48,500.00. [R. 34-35]

-4-

con-

The

amount
sale

owing
was

to the

first

$20,300.00.

trust

The

deed

amount

lender

owing

on

to

the

date

Associates

of
was

approximately $32,000.00. [R. 153 U8; 154 1114]
(f)

The plaintiff, Associates Financial Services, appeared

at the trustee's

sale conducted

by the

senior

lienholder

on

February 28, 1989 and submitted a bid in the sum of $26,000.00,
the high bid at the sale.
(g)
federal

[R. 153 1f8]

At the time of the trustee's sale, there were unreleased
tax

Associates

liens
had

of

record

actual

and

against

the

constructive

property

notice.

of

[R.

which
154

Us

elected

to

11-12]
(h)

The Internal

exercise

Revenue Service subsequently

its rights of redemption

under

the

U.S.C. §7425 and 28 U.S.C. §2410, and did
property on June
the

legal

8,

record

title

Financial Services.
(i)
an
12,

action

it

by paying
holder

of

of 26

in fact redeem

the

sum

the

property,

said

of $26,000.00

to

Associates

[R. 36]

The plaintiff, Associates Financial Services, commenced
in the

1989, seeking

owing

1989

provisions

by

the

court
to

below

recover

defendants

against

the

Slaughs

a deficiency
in

interest.

-5-

the

sum

of

balance

on

October
allegedly

$26,089.71,

plus

SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENTS

The lower court's summary judgment in favor of the plaintifflender was based upon erroneous conclusions of law.
Utah

Code

purchasing
from

Annotated

junior

bringing

§57-1-32

lienholder

an

action

months after the sale.

restricted

at the

for

a

senior

Utah

Code

than

three

(7) months following

the

Its action is therefore barred by statute.
Annotated

the property comprising
pro

quo

§57-1-32

limits

the

recovery,

owing over

the

the security.

extended

to

the

fair market
This

limit on

lender

in

benefit

of receiving

property which cannot be redeemed

value

an

title

of

recovery

exchange

the less expensive, quicker remedy of non-judicial
and the corresponding

in

under the Utah Trust Deed Act, to the

excess of the obligation

quid

more

sale,

The plaintiff did not file its action

action for a deficiency

is the

as a

foreclosure

deficiency

against the Slaughs until over seven
trustee's sale.

Associates,

for

foreclosure
to the

by the debtor following

real
the

sale.
The Utah "one-action rule" embodied
§78-37-1
an

action

sale.
stepped
of

the

precludes

the

plaintiff,

against

the

Slaughs

in Utah Code Annotated

Associates,

after

the

from

senior

bringing

foreclosure

Associates, as a purchasing junior lienholder, effectively
into the shoes of the
security

by

virtue

senior
of
-6-

its

lienholder
own

and

negligent

its

loss

conduct

effectively

bars

Associates

from

instituting

filed by it on October 12, 1989 in the court

the

complaint

below.

ARGUMENT
A.

ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES, AS A PURCHASING JUNIOR
LIENHOLDER AT THE SENIOR FORECLOSURE SALE, WAS BARRED
BY STATUTE FROM COMMENCING ITS ACTION AGAINST APPELLANTS
MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE SALE.

The

question

governed

of

whether

by the three

a

month

junior

limitation

lienholder

should

imposed

Utah

by

be
Code

Annotated §57-1-32 [See Addendum, p. A-1 , for text of statute.]
has

been

City

recently

Consumer

1991)

and

Adams

Limited

Services,

by

App. 1 9 8 9 ) .

considered

the

Utah

by

this

Court

Inc. v. Peters,
Court

Partnership

of

v.

Appeals

Durbano,

Both of these cases

815
in

782

involved

in

the

case

P. 2d 234
the
P.

case
2d

In

City

Consumer

Court reasoned
a

"sold-out

that

Services,

because

junior",

that

Inc.

City
it

G.

(Utah

property

sale.
v.

Consumer

became

of

juniors",

i.e., junior lienholders who did not purchase the real
at the senior lienholder's foreclosure

(Utah

962

"sold-out

of

an

Peters,

supra,

Services,

the

Inc. was

unsecured,

general

creditor and was not therefore pursuing a "deficiency

judgment"

governed

with

by

§57-1-32.

This

result

is

harmonious

language and operation of §57-1-32 and with standard
practice.

As

the

Utah

Court

of

-7-

Appeals

pointed

the

foreclosure
out

in

G.

Adams Limited Partnership v. Durbano, supra:
11

. . .[T]he interpretation urged by appellants
[that the statute should bar an action by a
sold-out junior after three months] would work
anomalous results in several situations. For
example, if a senior trust deed was foreclosed
nonjudicially, the beneficiary of a junior
trust deed would have only three months to
bring an action on the note formerly secured
by his or her trust deed. But what if that
note was not in default?
In appellants view,
the beneficiary would still have only three
months to bring an action even though no action
could be brought if no default existed.
If the
debtor could stay current for those three m o n t h s ,
he or she could then cease making any payments
whatsoever with absolute impunity."
Id. at 964
In the case at bar, the plaintiff-lender, Associates was
not a sold-out
the

senior

junior.

Associates

lienholder's

had an attorney

foreclosure

sale

who

present

acted

on

at
his

client's instructions and submitted a bid in the sum of $26,000,
an amount well below Associates' appraisal of the property.
This

presents

a fact

situation

not

previously

this Court but which has been addressed

considered

by

in the state of Cali-

fornia .
In Citrus

State

Bank

v.

McKendrick,

263

Cal.

Rptr.

781

(Cal. App., 2 Dist., 1 9 8 9 ) , Citrus State Bank, a junior trust
deed holder, was the successful
non-judicial

trustee's

text of opinion.]

sale.

bidder at a senior
[See Addendum,

lienholder's

p. A-12 for

full

Fourteen months later the bank filed for a

deficiency against the trustor, McKendrick.

-8-

The trial

court

entered a judgment of nonsuit on the bank's complaint

and the

bank

Appeals

appealed.

On

appeal,

the

California

Court

of

considered the precise issue of whether the three month period
of limitation
§580a

[See

provided

Addendum,

to bar an action

by California
page

A-2

the

sale of a more

California

worded

for text

of Civil

of

Code

substantially

the secured

senior

of

trust

Civil

similar

to

the

property

was,

the three
the

deed

conducted.
argument,

such

month

deed

of trust"

limitation

of trust
The

under

is

which

California

(emphasis

imposed
the

Court

only

580a

the

found

of

time,

in

Utah

]

Citrus State Bank argued on appeal that the
under

at

language

trust

at a fore-

Section

Code Annotated §57-1-32 [See Addendum, p. A - 1

"sale

applied

by a junior

deed.

Procedure

Procedure

statute.]

brought beyond that period

deed holder who has purchased
closure

Code

language

added)

meant

on the

that

holder

of

foreclosure

sale

is

being

of

rejected

this

Appeals

stating:

". . .[W]e conclude that a junior lienholder who
purchases the secured property at a senior foreclosure sale is bound by section 580a. It provides the exclusive remedy if such junior desires
to recover a deficiency judgment following a nonjudicial foreclosure."
Id. at 786.
In its discussion

in reaching that conclusion, the court

said:
"Finally, we reject the Bank's contention that
section 580a is limited by its terms to the
foreclosing senior. In the context of a
purchasing junior, there is no reason to make
the distinction urged by the bank. A junior
-9-

lienholder effectively steps into the shoes of
the senior when he purchases the secured property
at the senior's foreclosure."
Id. at 786-787.
(emphasis added)
In

that

Roseleaf

opinion,

the

court

Corp. v. Chierghino,

59

distinguished
Cal.

2d

873, 378 P. 2d 97 (1963), a case relied
decdiding

City

since Roseleaf

Consumer
involved

Services,

27

case

Cal.

of

Rptr.

upon by this Court in

Inc.

a "sold-out"

35,

the

v.

junior.

Peters,
The

supra,

California

Court of Appeals noted that:
"Unlike the sold-out junior the security for the
payment of [the purchasing junior 1 ienholder's]
debt has not been rendered valueless, but rather
he is protected by the difference between the
fair value of the property and the amount of the
foreclosure sale price. Upon completion of the
senior foreclosure sale he acquires an unredeemable
title which he is free to resell. Citrus State
Bank v. McKendrick, supra, at 787.
This result is consistent with the reasoning of the Utah
Court of Appeals

in G. Adams

supra,

which

declined

action

by a sold-out

the decision."
dict

the

to

junior

in City

supra, which recognized
becomes
not

unsecured

seeking

interpret

Id. at 964.

holding

as

Limited

who

Partnership
§57-1-32

"...did

Consumer

Services,

a result

of

and

the

an

participate

in

Inc.

v.

contraPeters,

junior

lienholder

senior

foreclosure

therefore

provisions of Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32.

-10-

Durbano,

barring

Neither does this result

that a sold-out

a "deficiency"

not

as

v.

not

subject

to

who
is
the

In this case, Associates Financial Services did participate
in the trustee's sale and was, in fact, secured for a substantial portion of the obligation then due on the Slaughs' promissory note.

Associates

was therefore

the trustee sale as it was

prior

as fully

to the

sale.

the value of the property was by virtue of
[R.

34-35]

and

it

had

actual

knowledge

liens encumbering the property.
The

three

Annotated
should

have

1989,

sale.

of

period

an action

In fact the

almost

eight

appraisal

federal

imposed

by

that

for deficiency

action

months

the

what

tax

[R. 154 1112]

limitation

initiated

after

It knew

its own

§57-1-32, if applied, would mandate

May 28, 1989.
12,

month

secured

was

after

senior

To allow Associates to do so in this

case

Code

Associates

on

commenced

the

Utah

or
on

before
October

foreclosure
is

contrary

to the purpose underlying the three month limitation provision
of the statute.
In Standard Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Kirkbride,
821 P. 2d 1136 (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) , this Court considered the operation
and effect of §57-1-32:
"A more sensible view of the operation of the three
month limitation period contained in section 57-1-32
is that its primary purpose is satisfied when the
foreclosing party provides notice to the debtor that
a deficiency will be sought by filing the action.
. . .Prior to the enactment of specific trust deed
foreclosure statutes, the general rule was that
after foreclosing on the property securing the note,
the mortgagor could wait the period of the statute
of limitations to give a debtor notice that it would
seek a deficiency judgment,
[citation omitted] This
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delay could leave the debtor in a state of financial uncertainty for years. Under trust deed
statutes such as section 57-1-32, the creditor
is given a speedy remedy of foreclosure and
sale, but in exchange, it must promptly put
the debtor on notice as to whether it will
seek any balance due by commencing an action.
Once this notice is given or the three month
time period runs, the debtor can plan accordingly." at 1138.
Associates

Financial

Services,

as

a

purchasing

junior

lienholder, stepped into the shoes of the senior seller and
became effectively bound by the provisions of §57-1-32.

At

the time the action should have been commenced, the Internal
Revenue

Service

had

not

exercised

its

redemption

rights

and

Associates still held the property as a secured creditor, all
rights of the Slaughs having been cut off at the sale.
made the election
below

market

liens

of record

at the sale to bid

value

with

against

actual
the

an amount

knowledge

property,

of

and

Having

significantly

the

federal

having

tax

thereafter

failed to commence an action to seek a deficiency within the
three month limitation period provided by §57-1-32, Associates
is barred from seeking a deficiency
B.

Even
sue

on

in any amount.

ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES IS LIMITED IN ITS
RECOVERY, IF ANY, TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
OBLIGATION OWED AND THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY.
if
the

Associates
note,

Financial

§57-1-32

Services

limits

were

permitted

to

Associates'

recovery

to

costs, attorney's fees, and deficiency in excess of $48,500.00,
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the

fair

market

foreclosure

value

by

Peters,

the

property

at

the

time

of

the

sale.

The fair market
examined

of

this

supra.

value provision

Court

of

§57-1-32

in

City

Consumer

Consistent

with

the

was

an

Services,

Court's

issue

Inc.

ruling

that

v.
a

sold-out junior became unsecured and was therefore not pursuing
a

"deficiency

judgment,"

the

Court

held

that

fair market

City

value

Consumer

Services was not limited

by the

provisions

of §57-1-32 from pursuing

its claim against the debtor

personally

Id. at 239 •
Where,
the

fair

apply.

however,
value

the

junior

limitations

of

The purpose of the

is to protect

the

debtor,

lienholder
the

statute

fair market
who

in

is not

"sold-out,"

should

provision

a non-judicial

logically

of

§57-1-32

foreclosure

has no right of redemption, from a creditor who could
the

property

at the

sale

for

a low

price

debtor liable for a large deficiency.

and

then

purchase
hold

First Security

the

Bank of

Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Utah 1 9 8 7 ) ;
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 378 P. 2d at 99.
In Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick,
Court

of

sold-out

Appeals
junior

limitations

of

recognized
lienholder

the

a junior

was

California

court noted, however, that
between

the

supra, the

holding
not

bound

in
by

anti-deficiency

. . ."there

Roseleaf
the

that

fair

is a real

a

value

statute.

lienor who purchases the secured
-13-

California

The

distinction
property

at

a senior sale and a junior who is ' sold-out ' ." 263 Cal. Rptr.
at 785.

Addressing this distinction the court stated:

"This is a distinction that was not present in
Roseleaf. 'The junior in Roseleaf did not purchase at the senior's sale. To apply the fair
value limitations to that junior would result
in the amount of his deficiency being limited
by the amount of someone else's bid, a factor
over which he has no control. However, once
a junior chooses to purchase, it is equitable
to apply the fair value limitations to him. 1 "
Id. at 785, quoting from Walter E. Heller
Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266,
221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
In the case at bar, there is every
fair

value

limitations

case

below.

reason

to Associates, the

Associates

submitted

a low

to

apply

plaintiff
bid

at

the

in

the

the

senior

foreclosure sale ($26,000.00) and could have, absent the fair
value limitations of §57-1-32, resold the property for $48,500
and

then

sued

the

Slaughs

for

the

difference

between

the

amount owing on the promissory note and the amount of the bid
in excess of the amount paid to the senior

lienholder.

This

is precisely the type of conduct that the statute is supposed
to

prevent.

reason

of

the

Whereas

a

senior

"sold-out"

sale

"deficiency",

a purchasing

shoes

senior

should

of the

be fairly

and

is

junior

lienholder

bound

by the

would govern, the senior.

junior

is

therefore
lienholder

unsecured
not

seeking

steps

into

and,

as a secured

same

rules

Otherwise, the

reaps the benefit of the non-judicial

which

purchasing

of the Utah Trust Deed Act, Utah Code Annotated
36,

i.e.,

the

or

junior

provisions

§§57-1-19 to

it receives title to the property which cannot
_1 A _

a

creditor,
govern,

foreclosure

by

be

redeemed

by

the

foreclosure

debtor

without

the

via

the

quid

less-expensive,

pro

quo,

i.e.,

non-judicial

the

limitations

on the c r e d i t o r s right to a deficiency judgment.
Services, Inc. v. Peters,
of

Utah,

Western,
Coppola

N.A.
Inc.

v.
v.

supra,

Felger,

supra,

Bloxham,

v. Superior

at 238; First

176

Court

at

183;

Cal.

(Singer),

Security

Walter

App.
259

City Consumer

3d

E.

266,

Cal.

Bank

Heller

270-271;

Rptr.

811,

820

(Cal. App., 2 Dist., 1989) .
The decision to submit a bid much lower than the
value of the real property
alone,

not

influenced

making

the

decision

became subject to the
Code Annotated

was

by the
to

§57-1-32.

debtors

bid

fair

a decision

at

the

value

or

made

by

a third

senior

Associates
party.

sale,

limitations

appraised

Associates

imposed

It cannot now complain

By

by

that

Utah

because

it did not have the opportunity, because of intervening events,
to

do

what

the

statute

proscribes,

that

the

statute

should

not now govern its action against the defendants who relinquished
their right of redemption

irretrievably when Associates received

a trustee's deed pursuant to its successful
If this
that

the

were

the

Slaughs

case, then
be

logic

accorded

their

and

bid

at the

fairness

redemption

would

compel

rights

which

they gave up, as quid pro quo, for the fair value
imposed on the creditor under §57-1-32.
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sale.

limitations

Since

Associates

has

availed

itself

of

the

benefits

of

the Utah Trust Deed Act, it should also be bound by the corresponding

limitations

Slaughs

should

be

of

the

limited

Act.

Its

to the

recovery

amount

against

by which

the

the

amount

of its indebtedness and the amount of the senior

lienholder's

indebtedness exceed the fair market

property

value

of the

at

the time of the foreclosure sale.
C.

ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL
SERVICES
IS BARRED
BY
THE
"ONE-ACTION" RULE FROM COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1

[See Addendum, p. A-4 for

full text of statute.] has come to be known as the

"one-action

rule"

as

and

has

mortgages.

been

held

Lockhart

to apply

Company

v.

to trust
Equitable

deeds
Realty,

well

as

Inc.,

657

supra,

the

P. 2d 1333 (Utah 1983)
In

City

Consumer

Services,

Inc.

v.

Peters,

Court addressed the effect of the one-action rule on a sold-out
junior lienor.

Citing the earlier case of Cache Valley

Banking

Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 56
1046

(1936) as authority,

rule

does

Services,

not

apply

to

the
a

Court

held

sold-out

that

the

junior.

Inc. v. Peters, 815 P. 2d at 2 3 7 .

reason

rule would

to treat

the

logically

purchasing

still

junior
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one-action

City

Consumer

Where,

however,

as in the case at bar, the junior lienholder is not
the one-action

P. 2d

apply.

lienholder

"sold-out",
There

is no

differently

than

the

foreclosing

senior

lienholder

since

the

purchasing

junior retains its secured status after the senior sale.
An exception
where

the

security

depleted

and

In

cases

such

to the one-action

maintained

interest

is valueless
the

the

through

courts

directly

in

have

upon

the

rule

no

held

has

real

been

property

fault

of the

that

an

personal

recognized
has

been

mortgagee.

action

may

obligation.

be

Cache

Valley Banking Co. v. Logan, supra, at 1049.
What constitutes
this

exception

was

"fault" of the mortgagee
considered

by the

U.S.

for purposes

District

of

Court

in

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, supra:
"The courts have found that a creditor is precluded
from seeking a deficiency only where the creditor's
negligence, or illegal conduct, has resulted in the
loss of the collateral, or where the creditor
voluntarily released the junior lien. Thus it has
been held that a secured creditor was barred from
recovery when (1) The creditor lost its lien because
of a failure to record a notice of assignment of
mortgage, Donaldson v. Grant, 49 P. 799 (Utah 1 8 9 7 ) ;
(2) The creditor released its lien because of its
belief that there was no equity in the collateral,
Lockhart, supra; (3) The creditor disposed of the
collateral by private sale under an illegal selfhelp remedy, Rein v. Callaway, 65 P. 63 (Idaho
1 9 0 1 ) ; and, (4) The creditor lost its interest in
the collateral because of its failure to present
a claim in a related probate proceeding, Hibernia
Savings & Loan Society v. Thornton, 42 P. 447
(Calif. 1 8 9 5 ) . " at 182.
*
In the case at bar, Associates Financial Services
in the

court

paying

the

liens

was

below

first
the

that

trust

"fault"

the

fault

deed
to

of

obligation

be

analyzed

-17-

the

defendants

and
in

argued

the

in

not

federal

tax

considering

this

issue.

This

begs

the debtor's

determining

the

inquiry

factor

would

junior

lienor

senior

sale,

manner

he desired,

dispose

"This

any

end

could

lienholder."
under

in an

important

"fault" in not paying the senior

the

declare,

the question

considered
in

every

conduct

himself

of

property

and

the
then

your

simply
fault

one-action

circumstances

the property.

be

there

is all
The

to

where

This clearly

rule
more

at

not

than

at

in

the

whatever

the debtor

paying

would

then

purchasing

pleased

afterward

point

were

court,

The

he

If

lienholder
the

case.
as

for

by

respect.

then
one

and

the

senior

never

apply

lien

encumbers

is not the intent of the

statute.

[See, e.g., Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty, Inc., supra]
It

is the

actions

the foreclosure

of

the

secured

creditor

sale that must be scrutinized

during

and

by the court to

determine the "fault", or absence thereof, which would
the application
exception should

of the one-action rule

was

only

or a finding

Financial

virtue

of decisions

that

Associates

knew what the fair market value of the
[R. 34-35] and had actual

property

was

and constructive

was

sale.

made

the sale and afterward that the security was lost.

the sale

that

Services

after the senior sale as it was before the
by

compel
the

apply.

In the case at bar, Associates
secured

after

It

during

Associates
prior

to

notice of

all matters affecting title to the property. [R. 154 1F12]
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as

Armed with this knowledge, Associates nevertheless
to

submit

a

$22,500.00

bid

at

less

the

than

sale

the

in

the

appraised

amount
value

of

of

rights and redeemed

the

property

by paying

$26,000.00,

the

Thereafter the Internal Revenue Service exercised

elected

property.

it redemption

to Associates

the

amount of its bid, $26,000.00.
POINT 1:

Associates was Negligent in Submitting a Bid
Substantially Below the Market Value of the
Property.

By submitting
of recorded

a bid

in the sum of $26,000.00

in the

I.R.S. tax liens against the property,

made a knowing

election, having

stepped

face

Associates

into the shoes of the

first lienholder, to accept that sum (although this is questionable as w e l l — s e e
Internal
sum

Revenue Service

of $26,000.00

owing
only

Point 2, p. 20 ) if it were tendered

the

was

senior

$5,700.00

in redemption

only

sufficient

lienholder

to

apply

to

Slaughs. [R. 153 1F8; R. 154 1114]
Associates was

clearly

of the

property.

to the

pay

($20,300.00),
the

negligent

by

the

leaving

obligation

the
The

amount

Associates

owing

it

by

the

Such conduct on the part of
given

the

knowledge

that

it

had prior to the foreclosure sale.
A purchaser

at a trustee's

sale is chargeable with

of any defects or irregularities as could have been
by careful
Property,
(1957 Ed.)

attention
Power

of

Actual

and
Sale

notice

diligent

inquiry.

Mortgages

and

or knowledge
-19-

of

discovered

Thompson

Trust
a tax

notice

on

Deeds,
lien

Real
§5185

is

not

required
Inc.

v.

by federal
Unique

statute

Industries,

[See Dimmitt
Inc.,

589

& Owens

F.

Supp.

1983).] nor is it required by state law.

Financial,

14

(D.

111.

Utah Code Annotated

§57-4a-2 provides, in pertinent part:
"A recorded document imparts notice of its contents,
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission
in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgement.
it

. . .

The

doctrine

of

caveat

emptor

sales under powers contained

still

applies

in deeds

to

of trust.

foreclosure
Randolph

v.

in submitting a low bid having

no

Simpson, 500 S.W. 2d 289 (Mo. App. 1973)
Associates was at fault
relationship to either the

fair market

value

of the

security

or to the sum of the amount owing on its promissory
the

amount

it was obligated

to pay

the

senior

note

and

lienholder

to

purchase the property.

This was an election made by a sophisti-

cated

face

creditor

should have

in

the

prompted

of

facts

a reasonable

and

and

circumstances

prudent

that

businessman

to

act otherwise.
POINT 2:

Associates was at Fault by Acquiescing in
the Redemption Amount Tendered by the
Internal Revenue Service.

The amount which the I.R.S. was required to pay to Associates
to

exercise

§7425
of

its

right

[See Addendum,

statute.]

of

redemption

P. A-5

is governed

under

, for text

by Title

-20-

Title

26

of pertinent

U.S.C.
portion

28 U.S.C. §2410(d)

which

reads:
"In any case in which the United States redeems
real property under this section or section7425
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the amount
to be paid for such property shall be the sum of-(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser
at such sale (which, in the case of a
purchaser who is the holder of the lien
being foreclosed, shall include the amount
of the obligation secured by such lien to
the extent satisfied by reason of such
sale),
(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined
under paragraph (1) at 6 per cent per annum
from the date of such sale, and
(
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess
of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in
connection with such property, over (B) the
income from such property plus (to the
extent such property is used by the purchaser)
a reasonable rental value of such property."
An explanation of the procedures to be followed is contained
in 26 Code of Federal Regulations §400.5-1.
P. A- 9 for text.]

[See Addendum,

Paragraph (c) of the regulation contains

a discussion of the amount to be paid and provides examples.
The Utah Trust Deed Act arguably fits in example
therefore equally
the Internal
sum

of

arguable that

, in the

instant

(2).

It is

case,

Revenue Service should have paid Associates

$48,500.00

($42,800.00

plus

the

$5,700.00

that
the

already

received by Associates to apply on its obligation), the fair
market value of the property.
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was

Associates argued

in the court

below

redeemed

I.R.S.

no

Associates

by

the

Financial

that

Services,

as

that

sale

since

ever

the

sale

occurred

purchaser.

This

to

line

of

reasoning makes no sense in the context of a foreclosure
and redemption

by the Internal

Revenue Service.

the "purchaser" under 28 U.S.C. §2410(d)(1)
case?

This

argument

was

implicity

sale

Who would

if this

rejected

by

were
the

be
the

Ninth

Circuit United States Court of Appeals

in the case of Bank of

Hemet v. United States, 643 F. 2d 661

(9th Cir.

case

involved

purchased

a bank which was

at the

senior

a second

lienholder's

1981).

lienholder

foreclosure

This

and

which

sale.

The

United States claimed a right to redeem by reason of a federal
tax

lien.

The central

price the government

issue in the

should have paid to the

related to that question

was

of the

Code

California

case was what

Civil

whether
(the

the

bank.

provisions

California

statute) should be applied to the Bank.

redemption
An

issue

of

§580a

anti-deficiency

(The court held that

§580a did apply to the Bank, a purchasing junior. Id. at 669)
The court first addressed the amount payable
and

concluded

redemption
28 U.S.C.

that,

price

given

the

facts

to which

the

Bank

§2410(d) was

value of the property
the

Bank

paid

to

that

amount

in
was

that

in

case,

entitled

by which

the

at the time of sale exceeded

purchase

the

-22-

property,

redemption

plus

that

pursuant

the
to

fair

market

the

amount

that

purchase

price paid by the Bank to acquire the property at the foreclosure
sale, plus such interest as was proper.
conclusion, the court reasoned

that

In arriving

the

amount

at

of the

this

Bank's

debt "satisfied by reason of such sale,"
11

. . .[I]s the amount by which the fair market
value of the property at the time of sale
exceeded the amount paid by the Bank for the
property at the time of sale. This is the
'(A) portion 1 of the section 2410(d) redemption price while the amount paid by the Bank
for the property of the sale is the '(B)
portion.'" JkL at 670.
Applying this analysis to the facts in the case at bar
yields the following result:
redemption

The " ( A ) " portion of the §2410(d)

price--the amount of Associates' debt

satisfied

by

reason of such sale — should have been the amount by which

the

fair market

value of

the

amount

by

paid

property

Associates

sale ($26,000.00).
The

the

" ( B ) " portion

for

the

($48,500.00)

exceeded

property

the

at

of

the

§2410(d)

redemption

price

is

the

lienholder's

($20,300.00).

The total
Associates
This

of

The " ( A ) " portion is therefore $22,500.00.

amount paid by Associates to discharge the first
claim

time

redemption

Financial

amount,

added

price

Services
to

the

payable
should

$5,700.00

by
have

the

government

been

Associates

to

$42,800.00.
received

to

apply to Slaughs' indebtedness, yields the figure of $48,500.00,
the fair market value of the property.
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Associates therefore compounded
a low bid by failing

to require

to pay the proper redemption
statutes

and regulations

its first error of submitting

the

Internal

Revenue

Service

by the

federal

price as mandated

pertaining

thereto.

This conduct

on

the part of Associates Financial Services was no less negligent
than the conduct referred to by Judge Winder

in First

Security

Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, supra, at 182.

Associates

therefore precluded from seeking a deficiency

judgment

the Slaughs by Utah Code Annotated

is
against

§78-37-1.

CONCLUSION
Associates Financial Services was time-barred from
its action more than three
by

Utah

Code

Annotated

lienor at the senior
of

the

bound

senior
to

deficiency

give

months
§57-1-32.

within

and,

debtors

as

notice

the time

the

As

sale, Associates

lienholder
the

after

a

foreclosure
purchasing

stepped

a

its

prescribed

by

sale
junior

into the

secured

of

initiating

shoes

creditor,

intent
law.

to

The

was

seek

a

judgment

of the lower court should therefore be reversed.
Even
bringing
having

if

Associates

its

action

derived

the

for

were
a

benefits

not

absolutely

deficiency
of

the

precluded

against

the

non-judicial

afforded by the Utah Trust Deed Act, Associates
by

the

limited

limitations

imposed

and

its

to the excess of the obligation
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owing

Slaughs,

foreclosure

is also

deficiency,

from

if

over

bound

any,
and

is

above

the fair market value of the property.
reversed and remanded to the
to

determine

the

amount

of

lower

The

court

deficiency

case
for

due,

should

further

be

hearing

consistent

with

Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32.
Associates
commencing

Financial

Services

is

further

barred

its action in the court below against the defendants-

appellants by the "one-action rule11 as set forth
Annotated §78-37-1.
sale
the
rule

proceedings
meaning
and

from

of

the

Associates'conduct

and
the

thereafter
recognized

judgment

of

the

during the

constituted
exception
court

in Utah Code

to

below,

foreclosure

"fault11
the
being

within

one-action
based

on

erroneous conclusions of law, should be reversed and a judgment
of nonsuit entered in favor of the defendants.
Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1992.

FRANKLIN L. SLAU6H
Pro Se and as Attorney
for Cheryl D. Slaugh
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of March, 1992, I

caused to be mailed four (4) copies of Appellants 1 Brief, postage
prepaid to:

Bryan W. Cannon
Attorney for Appellee
40 East South Temple #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to recover balance due upon obligation for which
trust deed was given as security.
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which
such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs,
and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair
market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch.
68, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment deleted language from the end of the first

and third sentences; added the fourth sentence;
and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation,
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JUDGMENT IN GENERAL

A complaint for divorce contained no
averments concerning property or the
husband's ability to pay alimony, and
prayed for divorce and for such other relief as might be just and within the jurisdiction of the court The part of a default judgment for divorce which awarded
alimony was not void, tinder this section,
nor subject to collateral attack on the
ground that the relief awarded was in excess of that prayed for. Cohen v. Cohen
(1906) 88 P. 267. 150 C. 99, 11 Ann.Cas.
iiT^;
•
'
A corporation was joined as defendant
in a divorce suit. The relief asked was
that it be enjoined from disposing of certain property conveyed by defendant's
husband to i t The judgment required defendants to "transfer and convey to said

§ 580a

receiver all of the property hereinabove
described/* and that said receiver hold the
same subject to the court's order. ^ The
judgment was erroneous, under this section. where there was no answer. Foley
v. Foley (1898) 52 P. 122, 120 C. 33, 65
Am.St.R. 147.
no. Review, default judgment
.
^^^i^.^ M A *# M M „,),*,.* A»
T
J?ri™S*fJ^^^
f
faultin
f * * « * " * • admitted m their answcr that property involved no longer belonged to them as trustees but that it had
been conveyed to the beneficiaries, any error in decree granting relief beyond that
prayed for in the complaint was not prejndicial to such defendants. Oil Tool Exchange v. Schuh (1945) 153 P.2d 976, 67
C.A.2d 288.

§ 580a.

Action for deficiency judgment after foredosore or trusteed sale; complaint; appraisal; deficiency computed
on basis of fair market value; limitation of actions;
necessity of sale
Whenever a money judgment is sought for the balance due upon
an obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage
with power of sale upon real property or any interest therein was
given as security, following the exercise of the power of sale in such
deed of trust or mortgage, the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaint the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by
said deed of trust or mortgage at the time of sale, the amount for
which such real property or interest therein was sold and the fair
market value thereof at the date of sale and the date of such sale.
Upon the application of either party made at least 10 days before the
time of trial the court shall, and upon its own motion the court at
any time may, appoint one of the inheritance tax referees provided
for by law to appraise the property or the interest therein sold as of
the time of sale. Such referee shall file his appraisal with the clerk
and tfat^same^hnB-hM^fi^ssible in evidence. Such referee Shall take"
and subscribe an oath to be attached to the appraisal that he has truly, honestly and impartially appraised the property to the best of his
knowledge and ability. Any referee so appointed may be called and
examined as a witness by any party or by the court itself. The court
must fix the compensation of such referee in an amount as determined by the court to be reasonable, but such fees shall not exceed
similar fees for similar services in the community where such services are rendered, which may be taxed and allowed in like manner as
other costs. Before rendering any judgment the court shall find the
fair market value of the real property, or interest therein sold, at the
16 CalXode—fc
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time of sale. The court may render judgment for not more than the
amount by which the entire amount of the indebtedness due at the
time of sale exceeded the fair market value of the real property or interest therein sold at the time of sale with interest thereon from the
date of the sale; provided, however, that in no event shall the
amount of said judgment, exclusive of interest after the date of sale,
exceed the difference between the amount for which the property was
sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by said deed
of trust or mortgage. Any such action must be brought within three
months of the time of sale under such deed of trust or mortgage. No
judgKSffF^sdUhbe-rendered in any such-action until the-real-property
or interest therein has first been sold pursuant to the terms of such
deed of trust or mortgage, unless such real property or interest therein has become valueless. /
(Added by Stats;l933, c. ^42, p. 1672, § 4. Reenacted by Stats.1935, c. 650,
p. 1805, § 4. Ainended by Stats.1968, c. 450, p. 1070, § 2; Stats.1970, c.
1282, p. 2320, § 1, eff. July 1,1971.)
Historical Note
This section was added in 1933 as a
part of an act which also amended Civil
Code | 2924, added Civil Code §§ 2924b,
2924c, 2924%, and added Code of Civii
Procedure f§ 580b, 580c, 725a. Section 9
of the 1933 act was a partial validity
tion.
*—»"J sec—

The 1970 amendment substituted inheritance tax "referees" for "appraisers".
-ftOK
. ,
. . , .. f ,,
m.
h e1935act a U o
s t a i n e d the followi.nJ
^Sec 9. It is the intent of this act to
rCenact sections 2924, 2924b and 2924c of
the Civil Code and sections 580a, 580b,
The 1935 act, which reenacted this sec- 580c and 725a of the Code of Civil Procetion, also reenacted all of the sections
dure in order to continue the same in efwhich were affected by the 1933 act, ex- feet subsequent to September 1, 1936, and
cept Civil Code § 2924%. Section 8 of remove any ambiguity created by the lanthe 1935 act was a partial validity provi- guage of jBection 2924% of the Civil Code
sion.
as added by an act approved June 2, 1933,
v *}? ?*?
u
The 1S68
in
" *»*°
f ^ J J T f that
w "sections
^ * * 2024,
££
mw*\>
...f Mamendment
*K. „nrsubstituted,
A. «ui
•«;„an. namount
. „ „the
„„. ^
intended
< u thewords
aixtt
senten^,
^«- I*
d ^ ^
f a
c w l ^
d

w t t o u t

m u n i ^ h U ^ .er^eTarT r S i d e ^
for the words "not to exceed five dollars
per day, and expenses for the time actually engaged in such appraisal".

« * ««" *•*•*»« * " • « • "
Operative effect of StatsJ.970, c 1282,
p. 2320, see Historical Note under Revenue and Taxation Code 113315.

Forms
See West's California Code Forms, Civil Procedure.
Cross References
Attorney's authority to conduct sale under power of sale, see Civil Code 5 2924a.
Foreclosure and deficiency judgment, see J 726.
Inheritance tax referee, appointment, see Probate Code $ 605; Revenue and Taxation
Code { 14501 et seq.
Invalidity of waiver of rights or privileges conferred by this section upon borrower, see
Civil Code § 2953.
Loggers and lumbermen's lien, foreclosure, see Civil Code $ 3065a.
Mechanic's lien foreclosure, deficiency judgment, see Civil Code J 3151.
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CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution.
78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution.
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded
rights barred.
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus
moneys.
78-37-5. Sales — When debt due in installments.

Section
78-37-6. Right of redemption — Sales by parcels — Of land and water stock.
78-37-7. Repealed.
78-37-8. Restraining possessor from injuring
property.
78-37-9. Attorney fees.

78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution.
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-1; L. 1965, ch. 172, § 1.
Cross-references. — Execution and pro-

A-4

ceedings supplemental thereto, Rule 69,
U.R.C.P.
lYust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq.

26 § 7425

PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Subtitle F

mail or by personal service, not less than 25 days prior to such
sale, to the Secretary.
(2) Consent to sale.—Notwithstanding the notice requirement of subsection (b)(2)(C), a sale described in subsection (b)
of property shall discharge or divest such property of the lien
or title of the United States if the United States consents to the
sale of such property free of such lien or title.
(3) Sale of perishable goods.—Notwithstanding the notice
requirement of subsection (b)(2)(C), a sale described in subsection (b) of property liable to perish or become greatly reduced
in price or value by keeping, or which cannot be kept without
great expense, shall discharge or divest such property of the
lien or title of the United States if notice of such sale is given
(in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) in
writing, by registered or certified mail or by personal service,
to the Secretary before such sale. The proceeds (exclusive of
co^ts) of such sale shall be held as a fund subject to the liens
artd claims of the United States, in the same manner and with
the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to
the property sold, for not less than 30 days after the date of
such sale.
(4) Forfeitures of land sales contracts.—For purposes of
subsection (b), a sale of property includes any forfeiture of a
land sales contract.
(d) Redemption by United States.—
(1) Right to redeem.—In the case of a sale of real property to
which subsection (b) applies to satisfy a hen prior to that of the
United States, the Secretary may redeem such property within
the period of 120 days from the date of such sale or the period
allowable for redemption under local law, whichever is longer.
(2) Amount to be paid.—In any case in which the United
States redeems real property pursuant to paragraph (1), the
amount to be paid for such property shall be the amount
prescribed by subsection (d) of section 2410 of title 28 of the
United States Code.
(3) Certificate of redemption.—
(A) In general.—In any case in which real property is
redeemed by the United States pursuant to this subsection,
the Secretary shall apply to the officer designated by 1QC^
law, if any, for the documents necessary to evidence tn
fact of redemption and to record title to such property *
the name of the United States. If no such officer is designated bv local law or if such officer fails to issue su
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documents, the Secretary shall execute a certificate of redemption therefor.
(B) Filing.—The Secretary shall, without delay, cause
such documents or certificate to be duly recorded in the
proper registry of deeds. If the State in which the real
property redeemed by the United States is situated has not
by law designated an office in which such certificate may
be recorded, the Secretary shall file such certificate in the
office of the clerk of the United States district court for the
judicial district in which such property is situated.
(C) Effect.—A certificate of redemption executed by the
Secretary shall constitute prima facie evidence of the regularity of such redemption and shall, when recorded, transfer to the United States all the rights, title, and interest in
and to such property acquired by the person from whom
the United States redeems such property by virtue of the
sale of such property.
(Added Pub.L. 89-719, Title I, § 109, Nov. 2, 1966. 80 Stat. 1141, and
amended Pub.L. 94-455, Title XIX, § 1906(b) (13) (A). Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat.
1834; Pub.L. 99-514, Title XV, § 1572(a). Oct. 22, 1986. 100 Stat. 2765.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1966 Act. Senate Report No. 1708. see
1966 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p.
3722.
1976 Act. House Report Nos. 94-*58,
94-1380, Senate Report No. 94-938. and
House Conference Report No. 94-1515.
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News.
p. 2897.
1986 Act. House Conference Report
No. 99-841 and Statement by President,
see 1986 U-S.Code Cong, and Adm.News.
p 4075
References in Text
Sections 2410 of title 28 of the United
C r erredt0
tC
241
f a i e S ,28,
^ Judiciary
^
! i n TJudicial
f ' l ^ i Proce^
ofjitle
and
re
*
Amendments
1986 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(4).
Pub.L. 99-514 added par. (4).
1976 Amendment. Pub.L. 94-455
struck out "or his delegate" following
"Secretary", wherever appearing.

Effective Dates
1986 Act. Section 1572(b) of Pub.L.
99-514 provided that: 'The amendment
made by subsection (a) [amending subfec; ( c ) o f l r h l s section] shall apply to
forfeitures after the 30th day after the
date
° f !*ie e n a c l m e n l o f t h l s A c t [Oct.
22
« 1986]
1976 Act. Amendment by Pub.L.
94
^ \ 5 effective the first day of the first
m o n t h w h l c h b e i n s m o r e t h a n 90
S
' £ays
a ffl e r 0 c L 4 1 9 7 6
'
' ** s e c t , o n 1 9 0 6 W o f
Pub.L. 94-455. set out as a note under
section 6013 of this title.
1966 Act
Sectlon apphcabIe
aftcr
N o v 2 1966j r e g a r d l e s s of w h c n t h e titie
or hen of the United States arose .or
per
son was acquired, with certain exceptlons see
'
§ lH(aWc) of Pub.L. 89-719,
set o u l a s a n o l e u n d e r
§ 6323 of lhis
mle
Prior Provisions
A prior section 7425 was renumbered
7434

w h e n l h e h e n o r m l e r e s l of a n o l h f i r

CROSS REFERENCES
Civil remedies for satisfaction of unpaid fine, see 18 USCA § 3613.
447
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§ 2410

actions in the State courts service upon the United States shall be
made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the complaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the
action is brought jor upon an assistant United States attorney or
clerical employee designated by the United States attorney m writing filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought
and by sending copies of the process and complaint, by registered
mail, or by certified mail, to the Attorney General of the United
States at Washington, District of Columbia
In such actions the
United States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty
days after such seivice or such further time as the court may allow
(c) A judgment or decree in such action or suit shall have the
same effect respecting the discharge of the property from the mortgage or other hen held by the United States as may be provided
with respect to such matters by the local law of the place where the
court is situated
However, an action to foreclose a mortgage or
other hen, naming the United States as a pait\ under this section,
must seek judicial sale A sale to satisfy a hen inferior to one of
the United States shall be made subject to and without disturbing
the hen of the United States, unless the United States consents that
the property may be sold free of its hen and the proceeds divided as
the parties may be entitled Where a sale of real estate is made to
satisfy a hen prior to that of the United States the United States
shall have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem,
except that with respect to a hen arising under the internal revenue
laws the period shall be 120 days or the period allowable for redemption under State law, whichever is longer, and in any case in
which, under the provisions of section 505 of the Housing Act of
1950, as amended (12 U S C 1701k), and subsection (d) of section
1820 of title 38 of the United States Code, the right to redeem does
not arise, there shall be no right of redemption In any case where
the debt owing the United States is due, the United States may ask,
by way of affirmative relief, for the foreclosure of its own hen and
where property is sold to satisfy a first hen held by the United
States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not exceed*ng the amount of its claim with expenses of sale, as may be directed
by the head < or his delegate) of the department or agency of the
United States which has charge of the administration of the laws in
Aspect to which the claim of the United States arises
(d) In any case in which the United States redeems real property
under this section or section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of
19
H the amount to be paid for such properU shall be the sum of—
(1) the actual amount paid by
(which, in the case of a purchaser
being foreclosed, shall include the
cured b\ such hen to the extent
sale),

the purchaser at such sale
who is the holder cf the hen
amount of the obligation sesatisfied b\ leason of such
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(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined under paragraph (1)) at 6 percent per annum from the date of such sale,
and
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in connection with such property,
over (B) the income from such property plus (to the extent
such property is used by the purchaser) a reasonable rental
value of such property
(e) Whenever any person has a lien upon any real or personal
property, duly recorded m the jurisdiction in which the property is
located, and a junior hen, other than a tax hen, in favor of the United States attaches to such property such person may make a written request to the officer charged with the administration of the
laws in respect of which the hen of the United States arises, to
have the same extinguished
If after appropriate lm estigation, it
appears to such officer that the proceeds from the sale of the property would be insufficient to wholly or partly satisfy the hen of the
United States, or that the claim of the United States has been satisfied or by iapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable,
such officer shall so report to the Comptroller General who may issue a certificate releasing the property from such hen
June 25, 1948, c 646, 62 Stat 972, May 24, 1949, c 139, § 119, 63
Stat 105, July 7, 1958, Pub L 85-508, § 12(h), 72 Stat 348, June
11, 1960, P u b L 86-507, § 1(20), 74 Stat 201, Nov 2, 1966, Pub L
89-719, Title II, § 201, 80 Stat 1147
Historical and Revision

Notes

Renser's Note 1948 Act
Based on
Title 28, U S C 1940 ed H &01 902 904,
905 (Max 4 193L, c 515 §§ 1, 2, 4 5 4S
Stat 1528, 1529, Maj 17, 1932 c 190 4T
Stat 158, June 25 1936 c 80i, 49 Stat
1921, June 6, 1910, c 242 54 Stat 234,
Dec 2, 19*2, c 656, f| 1-3 56 Stat 1026)

Mith respect to seruce of process and
complaint upon the United States in suits
brought in State courts This is provid
ed for b\ rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Ci\il Procedure (this title] with
respect to such suits in United States dis
tnct courts

Provisions including the districts of
Hattaii and Puerto Rico and the District
Court of the United States for the Dis
tnct of Columbia in section 901 of Title
28, U S C , 1940 ed 'were omitted as co%
ered by 'any district court
See section
451 of this title

References In Text The internal re*ve
nue laws referred to in subsec (b), are
classified general!} to Title 26, Internal
Revenue Code

Section 505 of the Housing Act of 1950
am Jtt
« d^ (12 U S C 1701k) and sub
section (d) of section 1820 of title 38 of
Prp\isions in section 902 of Title 28, t n e United States Code, referred to m
U S C 1940 ed, relating to process, vere s u u s e c (c), are classified respettneb to
omitted as co\ered b\ Rule 4 of the Fed section 1701k of Title 12 Banks and Bank
eral Rules of Cml Procedure (this title] in& * n d section 1820(d) of Title 38, Vet
erans Benefits
Changes were made in phraseolog\
Section 7425 of the Internal Re%enue
1949 Act This amendment conform^ Code of 1954 referred to in subsec (d)
the language of section 2410(b) of titu is classified to section 7425 of Title 26.
28 U S C , with that of the prior law Internal Re\enue Code
as
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formation described in subdivisions (i),t cprdance with the provisions ofpara(i£, ifiii), and (iv) of^his" Subparagraph/* graj&rj^.,Xl.):.4^^isrsection, in such a
.^U^The-name^and address off the case "trie' district director may, in his
pel*sbn submitting the notice of sale.
discretion, consent to the sale of the
- (hi A copyr of each Notice of J?ed£raC^
the
^axlLieri (^
States even though notice of
•pfbperty to be sold, or the following the sale, is not^iy^n 25 days-prior to
iiiformation as v : s ^
in which the
Notifcerof Federal^kx :fienT~ u ^
-ftersbh who submitted a timely notice
"4a> The internal revenue district does.. IXQU rece^vB,- -more than 5 days
namgdiheiwn,-----.^^
of the sale, written
;(by The name and address of the tax-notification from the district, director
payer, and
_ ... „
.Uiat 4>hfx^iotice is" mad^quateTs the
j&SinM-4aX*&^
s n a i i be considered adequate for
tfte notice
the purposes of this section, ~
:
(lift With respect to ttje property, .to
r(^s Acknowledgment- of notice. If a
Resold, thfe tP^w^^in#rroaii
notice of sale described in paragraph
(a),A detailed description, including (c) or (e)i of this section is submitted in
v
location, of the property affected by
to the district director with
tbe notice (in the case of teaf proper-, i;;^dupijcate
"a"
written
request that receipt of the
ty, the street address, city, and State
_ nojycevbe: acknowledged and returned
and the legal d e s c r i p t i o n , c o n t a i n e d * * ^ ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^
*&:title or deed t o ^ l ^ y
« ^ ^
P v S ^ e , ^ ^ SEEKERS
^ f trtet
S|H>. -*- J.—-*?**'*
*-* --director. The acknowledgment by the
(6) The date, time, place, andj*rms
i ^ ^ of t h e
^4he-pr«posed^a^^f ^fce :rx^erty\ - ^^^^
raeipt o f t n e n o t l c e *
ajig
i±) Disclosure of adequacy
of-notice.
(c) l n t h e c a s e ~ o f a s a l e o t perisri^ble : T h e . district director for t n e internal
property described in paragrarHi^e) o f ^vefnTe
district in which the sale was
this section, a statement of.tfie.rea- n e l d ^ authorized
to disclose, to any
wno nas a
sons why the property js believe^to be - P^Prj
proper interest,
perishable.
_ ^.
/>7 y\'-^^^&^f^^
^''-^&i^B.te notice of sale
u
(1) of
^iv) The approximate Wbiint Qfjjie •..- wi&.,g|y^n^
bh^ationTln^c^
(f). Any person desirpFincipal-obligatioiir
secured by the lien sought to be en- ing this information should submit^ to
forced and a^descrio^^
requestBXpenles/<s^uch as
feg^P
clearly describes the property
ing costs, etc.) which may be charged sold, identifies th^^Lpplicable notice of ?
against the ^aieLProceeds* r ™, -•.^ ^ ; ^ '
the reasons for requesting
¥~f2> inadequate notice. Except as oth- ^^ier^lives
'ttte*'mformation,
states the name
erwise provided in this subparagraph, and address of theand
person
making-theM
a notices! ^ai^deg^l^.mrparagrapy
tcY of this section^whicn does not cdh- - j&eqtaest:
[T.D. 61944, 33 FR 734. Jan. 20,;;19JJ8; ^ 3 . j ^ .
tain t h e information described in sub-.,<«.*. T ^ « * izw
lbWi
paragraph < © o o f *«ais^rai^graptf H&£^ ™* ^^^
wifirnot be considered adequate by a § m^{
Redemption ^ r r i t e U S i ^ s
^
district director. If-a distnet director
^ ; ^ - v ^ ^ : a r . ->- -•*-*:•
~*
v
de:tf32tfine«" tfiatfch^n^fcicef"is maoV" * &%2&ope. The purpose of this seciSquate, he'wiH1 give written notifica- ^io-^erproTisicnis^cdriCalned
tibn is to prescribe rules with
in respect
section
tion of the items of mforrftatipn.whierr
g|3ginadequate to the person who* sub-' ^42St5V, relating to redemption of real
ihitted the notice. In such event -a property by the United States. Section
notice "complying with the provisions 109 of the Federal JTax Lien Act of
of this sectionJ including the require- 1966 (30 Stat. 114D amended the Inmjent thattrie notice be given 25 days tcrhal 5:Revenue Code of 1954 byt0
prior to the sale in the case of a notice adding^ gjnew section.7A2§nrejating;
<Jejscrj&ed^^^^
of tax lien£~effec1ive
wbn^liiust l ^ g i v e n . However, in 4c-. after November 2,1966.
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(b) Right to redeem—(I) In general. holder of the lien being foreclosed,
In the case of a nonjudicial sale of real shall include the amount of the obligaproperty to satisfy a lien prior to the tion secured by such lien to the extent
tax lien, the district director may legally satisfied by reason of the sale);
(ii) Interest on the amount paid (deredeem the property within the redemption period (as described in sub- scribed in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (b)). paragraph) at the sale by the purchasThe right of redemption of the United er of the real property computed at
States exists under section 7425(d) the rate of 6 percent per annum for
even though the district director has the period from the date of the sale
consented to the sale under section (as determined under paragraph
7425(c)(2) and paragraph (d) of (b)(l)(iv), (v), and (vi) of §400.4-1) to
§ 400.4-1. For purposes of this section, the date of redemption; and
the term "nonjudicial sale" shall have
(iii) The amount, if any, equal to the
the same meaning as when used in excess of (a) the expenses necessarily
paragraph (b)(1) of § 400.4-1.
incurred in connection with such prop(2) Redemption period. For purposes erty by the purchaser, over (b) the
of this section, the redemption period income from such property realized by
the purchaser plus a reasonable rental
shall be—
<
(i) The period beginning with the value of such property (to the extent
date of the sale (as determined under the property is used by or with the
paragraph (bXIXiv), (v), and (vi) of consent of the purchaser, or is rented
§ 400.4-1) and ending with the 120th at less than its reasonable rental
value).
day after such date, or
(ii) The period for redemption of
(2) Examples. The provisions of subreal property allowable, with resepct paragraph (lXi) of this paragraph (b),
to other secured creditors, under local may be illustrated by the following exlaw of the place where the real proper- amples:
ty is located,
Example (2). A, a delinquent taxpayer,
owns Blackacre located in X State upon
whichever is longer.
which B holds a mortgage. After the mort(3) Limitations. In the event a sale gage is properly recorded, a notice of tax
does not ultimately discharge the lien is filed which is applicable to Blackacre.
property from the tax lien (whether Subsequently, A defaults on the mortgage
by reason of local law or the provi- and B forecloses on the mortgage which has
sions of section 7425(b)), the provi- an outstanding obligation in the amount of
$100,000. At the foreclosure sale, B bids
sions of this section do not apply since $50,000
obtains title to Blackacre as a
the tax lien will continue to attach to result ofand
the sale. At the time of the foreclothe property after the sale. In a case sure sale, Blackacre has a fair market value
in which the Internal Revenue Service of $75,000. Under the laws of X State, the
is not entitled to a notice of sale under mortgage obligation is fully satisfied as a
section 7425(b) and §400.4-1, the result of the foreclosure sale and the mortUnited States does not have a right of gagee cannot obtain a deficiency judgment.
redemption under secton 7425(d). Under subparagraph (l)(i) of this parathe district director must pay
However, in such a case, if a tax lien graph,
$100,000 in order to redeem Blackacre.
has attached to the property at the
Example (2). Assume the same facts as in
time of sale, the United States has the
(1), except that under the laws of
same right of redemption, if any, example
X State, the fair market value of the propwhich is afforded to any secured credi- erty foreclosed is the amount of the obligator under the local law of the place in tion legally satisfied as a result of the forewhich the property is situated.
closure sale, and in a case in which the
(c) Amount to be paid—il) In gener- amount of the obligation exceeds the
al. In any case in which a district di- amount of the fair market value of the
rector exercises the right to redeem property, the mortgagee has the right to a
for the deficiency computed as
real property, the amount to be paid is judgment
the difference between the obligation and
the sum of the following amounts—
the fair market value of the property. In
(i) The actual amount paid for the such a case the district director must, under
property being redeemed (which, in subparagraph (lXi) of this paragraph, pay
the case of a purchaser who is the $75,000 in order to redeem Blackacre,
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§401.6325-1
whether or not B seeks a judgment for the
deficiency
Example (J) Assume the same facts as in
example (1) except that under the laws of
X State the amount bid is the amount of
the obligation legally satisfied as a result of
the foreclosure sale and in the case in
which the amount of the obligation exceeds
the amount bid the mortgagee has the
right to a judgment for the deficiency com
puted as the difference between the amount
of the obligation and the amount bid In
such a case the district director must under
subparagraph (l)(i) of this paragraph pay
$50,000 in order to redeem Blackacre
whether or not B seeks a judgment for the
deficiency

(d) Certificate of redemption—(1) In
general If a district director exercises
the right of redemption of the United
States described in paragraph (b) of
this section, he shall apply to the officer designated by local law, if any, for
the documents necessary to evidence
the fact of redemption and to record
title to the redeemed property in the
name of the United States If no such
officer has been designated by local
law or if the officer designated by
local law fails to issue the necessary
documents, the district director is authorized to issue a certificate of redemption for the property redeemed
by the United States
(2) Filing The district director shall,
without delay, cause either the documents issued by the local officer or
the certificate of redemption executed
by the district director, described in
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph
(d), to be duly recorded in the proper
registry of deeds If a certificate of redemption is issued by the district director and if the State in which the
real proDerty redeemed by the United
States is situated has not by law designated an office in which the certificate of redemption may be recorded,
the district director shall file the certificate of redemption in the office of
the clerk of the U S district court for
the judicial district in which the redeemed property is situated
(3) Effect of certificate of redemption, A certificate of redemption executed prusuant to subparagraph (1) of
this paragraph (d), shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the regularity
of the redemption When a certificate
of redemption is recorded, it shall
transfer to the United States all the
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rights, title, and interest m and to the
redeemed property acquired by the
person from ^hom the district direc
tor redeemed the property by virtue of
the sale of the property
(4) Application for release of right of
redemption Upon application of a
party with a proper interest in the real
property sold in a nonjudicial sale de
scribed in section 7425(b) and para
graph (b) of § 400 4-1, which real property is subject to the right of redemp
tion of the United States described in
this section, the district director may,
in his discretion, release the right of
redemption with respect to the property The application for the release
shall be submitted in writing to a dis
tnct director and shall contain such
information as the district director
may require If the district director de
termines that the right of redemption
of the United States is without value,
no amount shall be required to be paid
with respect to the release of the right
of redemption
[T D 6944, 33 FR 737 Jan 20 1968]

PART
401—TEMPORARY
PROCEDURES
AND
ADMINISTRATION
REGULATIONS UNDER THE TAX
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 (PUB. L 97-248)
§ 401 6325-1

Release of hens

(a) In general The district director
shall issue a certificate of release for a
filed notice of Federal tax lien not
later than 30 days after the date on
which the district director finds that
the entire tax liability listed in such
notice of Federal tax lien has been
fully satisfied (as defined in paragraph
(c) of this section) or has become le
gaily unenforceable
(b) Certificate of release for a lien
which has become legally unenforce
able The district director shall have
the authority to file a notice of Feder
al tax lien which also contains a certif
icate of release pertaining to those
liens which become legally unenforce
able. Such release will become effec
tive as a release as of a date prescribed
in the document containing the notice
of Federal tax lien and certificate of
release.
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CITRUS STATE BANK, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
William J. McKENDRICK, Defendant
and Respondent
Civ. No. B040211.
Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 3.
Nov. 16, 1989.

Following purchase at foreclosure sale
of more senior deed of trust, bank sought
deficiency. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Gregory C. O'Brien, Jr., J.,
dismissed, and bank appealed. The Court
of Appeal, Croskey, J., held that threemonth period of limitations applicable to
deficiency actions applies to a junior trust
deed holder who has purchased the secured
property at the foreclosure sale of senior
trust deed.
Affirmed.

1. Mortgages «=»375
Three-month limitation period for deficiency actions following mortgage foreclosure applies to bar an action for a deficiency judgment brought beyond that period by a junior trust deed holder who has
purchased the secured property at a foreclosure sale of a more senior trust deed.
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 580a.
2. Mortgages «=»378
Foreclosure sale under deed of trust
cut off security interests of all Benholders
junior to the foreclosed trust deed.
3. Mortgages «=»375
Three-month limitation period for deficiency judgment following foreclosure of
deed of trust or mortgage does not apply to
a nonpurchasing junior trust deed holder.
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 580a.
4. Mortgages <fc*375
Statute dealing with deficiency judgment after foreclosure of deed of trust or
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mortgage provides the exclusive remedy if
junior lienholder who purchases secured
property at senior foreclosure sale desires
to recover deficiency judgment following
nonjudicial foreclosure.
5. Mortgages <3=»375
Statute which prohibits deficiency
judgment following nonjudicial foreclosure
of deed of trust or mortgage will not be
applied to bar deficiency judgment to junior
lienor purchasing at senior's sale. West's
Ann.GaLC.C.P. § 580d.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On September 29, 1983, the Bank made a
loan to McKendrick in the sum of $38,445.
Repayment of the loan was secured by a
deed of trust executed by McKendrick on a
parcel of residential real property located
in Temple City, California. This deed of
trust was subordinate to four senior trust
deeds, three judgment liens and one Employment Development Department lien in
favor of the State of California. The total
of these senior encumbrances was approximately $154,000.

Plaintiff Citrus State Bank ("Bank") appeals from a judgment following a nonsuit
on its complaint to recover such a deficiency judgment against the defendant William
J. McKendrick ("McKendrick"). Because
we conclude that the Bank, as a junior
lienholder who purchased the secured real
property at a senior foreclosure, (1) is
bound by section 580a and (2) failed to
bring its action within the required three
month period, we affirm the judgment

[2] On February 28, 1984, the holder of
the third trust deed recorded a notice of
default under her deed of trust and a trustee's (non-judicial) foreclosure sale was set
for June 20, 1984. On that date, the Bank,
in order to protect its own subordinate
claim, was the successful bidder at the
sale. At that time the total combined debts
against the property were $192,386.38 (including the amount owed to the Bank of
$38,445, plus interest at 13.5% for a total of
$41,369.98.) The Bank purchased the property for the total sum of $45,132 and received a trustee's deed which was dated
June 20, 1984 and ultimately recorded on
December 7,1984.2 The property was later
resold by the Bank on May 29, 1985, for
$146,500. The Bank claims that this was
an open market sale and the price received
represented the then fair market value of
the property.3
On August 8, 1985, over 14 months after
the date of the foreclosure sale, the Bank
filed this action against McKendrick seeking a deficiency judgment for the full
amount of the unpaid note, plus interest
The case went to trial on November 15,
1988 and McKendrick made a motion for a
nonsuit on the ground that the action had
not been filed in a timely manner. McKen-

1. Unless otherwise indicated all code references
are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

off the security interests of all henholders junior
to the foreclosed third trust deed.

2. Although it is not entirely clear from the
record, it appears that the Bank bid enough to
pay off the encumbrance of the foreclosing
third trust deed holder, plus interest, costs and
trustee fees, and simply took title to the secured
property subject to all remaining senior encumbrances. Of course, such foreclosure sale cut

3. However, we note that the record reflects that
the Bank's own appraisal of the property in July
of 1983 (made when it approved McKendrick's
loan application) reflected a valuation of $167,000.

McAlpin, Doonan & Seese, Daniel J. Doonan, Corina, for plaintiff and appellant
Patrick L. Barnes, Arcadia, for defendant and respondent
CROSKEY, Associate Justice.
[1] This case raises the novel question
of whether the three month period of limitation, set out in Code of Civil Procedure
section 580a \ applies to bar an action for a
deficiency judgment brought beyond that
period by a junior trust deed holder who
has purchased the secured property at a
foreclosure sale of a more senior trust
deed. We hold that it does.
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drick argued that the Bank was seeking a
deficiency judgment after a non-judicial
foreclosure sale and was therefore required, under the provisions of section
580a, to file the action within three months
of the date of the sale. The trial court
agreed and granted the motion. The
Bank's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. After entry of a judgment based on the nonsuit order, the Bank
filed a timely appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
[3] As already noted, the central issue
presented here is whether the three month
limitation period in section 580a applies to a
junior trust deed holder who purchases the
secured property at the foreclosure of a
more senior trust deed.4 Obviously, if it
does then the trial court's ruling was correct However, the Bank argues that it
should be treated no differently than a
sold-out junior who does not purchase the
property and that therefore the applicable
limitations period should be four years, as
provided in section 337. McKendrick, on
the other hand, contends that the fact that
the Bank was the purchaser makes a critical difference and that all of the provisions
of section 580a, including the three month
limitations period, are applicable and the
Bank's action was therefore untimely.
4. As we explain below, it clearly does not apply
to a non-purchasing junior trust deed holder.
Such a "sold-out" junior is not bound by the
limitations of section 580a and may sue for the
full amount of the unpaid obligation without
regard to those limitations.
5. Section 580a as it read at times relevant to this
matter, provided:
"Whenever a money judgment is sought for
the balance due upon an obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage with
power of sale upon real property or any interest
therein was given as security, following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed of trust
or mortgage, the plaintiff shall set forth in his
complaint the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by said deed of trust or
mortgage at the time of sale, the amount for
which such real property or interest therein was
sold and the fair market value thereof at the
date of sale and the date of such sale. Upon the
application of either party made at least 10 days
before the time of trial the court shall, and upon
its own motion the court at any time may.
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DISCUSSION
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a creditor secured by a trust deed or
mortgage on real property may recover the
full amount of the debt upon default. He
may realize the security or sue on the
obligation or both; the obligation is an
independent undertaking by the debtor to
pay. [Citation.] In most states now, however, the creditor's right to enforce such a
debt is restricted by statute. Thus, in California the creditor must rely upon his security before enforcing the debt (Code
Civ.Proc., §§ 580a, 725a, 726.) If the security is insufficient, his right to a judgment against the debtor for the deficiency
may be limited or barred by sections 580a,
580b, 580d, or 726 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
"Under sections 580a and 726, proceedings for a deficiency must be initiated within three months after either a private sale
under a power of sale or a judicial sale, and
the recovery may not exceed the difference
between the amount of the indebtedness
and the fair market value of the property
at the time of the sale." (Roseleaf Corp. v.
Chierigkino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 38-39, 27
CaLRptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97, fn. omitted.)
Section 580a5 was enacted in 1933 and
provides that the amount of a deficiency
appoint one of the probate tax referees provided
for by law to appraise the property or the interest therein sold as of the time of sale. Such
referee shall file his appraisal with the clerk and
the same shall be admissible in evidence. Such
referee shall take and subscribe an oath to be
attached to the appraisal that he has truly, honestly and impartially appraised the property to
the best of his knowledge and ability. Any
referee so appointed may be called and examined as a witness by any party or by the court
itself. The court must fix the compensation of
such referee in an amount as determined by the
court to be reasonable, but such fees shall not
exceed similar fees for similar services in the
community where such services are rendered,
which may be taxed and allowed tn like manner
as other costs. Before rendering any judgment
the court shall find the fair market value of the
real property, or interest therein sold, at the
time of sale. The court may render judgment
for not more than the amount by which the
entire amount of the indebtedness due at the
time of sale exceeded the fair market value of
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judgment after a non-judicial foreclosure
sale of secured real property shall be "the
lesser of 1) the excess of the indebtedness
over the fair market value of the property
or 2) the excess of the indebtedness over
the sale price. Enacted at a time when the
Depression had depleted cash and credit
[citation], the statute was 'designed to prevent creditors from buying in at their own
sales at deflated prices and realizing double
recoveries by holding debtors for large deficiencies.' (Walter E. Heller Western,
Inc. v. Bloxham (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 266,
270-271, 221 CaLRptr. 425, quoting from
Roseleaf Corp. v. Ckierigkino, supra, 59
Cal.2d 35, 40, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d
97.) The section also provided at the time
of the subject foreclosure, that "Any such
action must be brought within three
months of the time of sale under such deed
of trust or mortgage." €
While this section, as well as related
anti-deficiency provisions, is fairly easy to
apply in the context of a single lienholder,
difficulties arise when there are multiple
encumbrances and a foreclosure sale by
one leaves others with their previously secured obligations unpaid. For example,
what are the rights of a junior trust deed
holder whose interest is foreclosed, along
with the debtor's, by the non-judicial sale
of the secured property under a more senior Ken?
This issue was addressed by the Supreme
Court in Roseleaf Corp. v. Ckierigkino,
supra, 59 Cal.2d 35, 27 CaLRptr. 873, 378
P.2d 97, where it was held that the limita-

tions of section 580a did not extend to "sold
out" junior lienholders. The court explained that, "The position of a junior lienor whose security is lost through a senior
sale is different from that of a selling
senior lienor. A selling senior can make
certain that the security brings an amount
equal to his claim against the debtor or the
fair market value, whichever is less, simply
by bidding in for that amount. He need
not invest any additional funds. The junior
lienor, however, is in no better position to
protect himself than is the debtor. Either
would have to invest additional funds to
redeem or buy in at the sale. Equitable
considerations favor placing this burden on
the debtor, not only because it is his default that provokes the senior sale, but also
because he has the benefit of his bargain
with the junior lienor who, unlike the selling senior, might otherwise end up with
nothing." (IcL, at p. 41, 27 CaLRptr. 873,
378 P.2d 97.)
Thus, a sold-out junior lienholder whose
interest is lost by virtue of a senior foreclosure is free to sue directly on his unpaid
(and now unsecured) note and is not encumbered by the provisions of section 580a.
That is, the amount of the deficiency is not
limited, there is no need to obtain a fair
market appraisal of the secured property
and it is not necessary that the action be
commenced within three months of the
foreclosure sale. The applicable limitations
period is four years as provided in section
337.7 However, this rule does not apply
where the junior lienholder is the purchaser

such action must be brought within three
thc real property or interest therein sold at the
months of the time of sale under the deed of
time of sale with interest thereon from the date
trust or mortgage." (New language underof the sale; provided, however, that in no event
lined.)
shall the amount of said judgment, exclusive of
interest after the date of sale, exceed the difference between the amount for which the proper- 7. Section 337 provides for a four year limitations for "An action upon any contract, oblity was sold and the entire amount of the indebtgation or liability founded upon an instrument
edness secured by said deed of trust or mortin writing, except as provided in Section 336a of
gage. Any such action must be brought within
three months of the time of sale under such deed this code; provided, that the time within which
any action for a money judgment for the balof trust or mortgage. No judgment shall be
ance due upon an obligation for the payment of
rendered in any such action until the real propwhich a deed of trust or mortgage with power
erty or interest therein has first been sold pursuof sale upon real property or any interest thereant to the terms of such deed of trust or mortin was given as security, following the exercise
gage, unless such real property or interest thereof the power of sale in such deed of trust or
in has become valueless.** (Emphasis added.)
mortgage, may be brought shall not extend beyond three months after the time of sale under
6. Effective July 1, 1989, this penultimate sensuch deed of trust or mortgage.''
tence in section 580a was changed to read: "Any
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of the secured property at the senior foreclosure.
The first California case involving a purchasing junior lienholder was Walter E.
Heller Western Inc. v. Bloxham, supra,
176 Cal.App.3d 266, 221 Cal.Rptr. 425. Although the case involved the "fair value"
provisions of section 580a, it is directly
applicable here. The plaintiff, Heller, was
the holder of a subordinated deed of trust
and purchased the secured property at the
senior's non-judicial foreclosure sale. Following the sale, Heller filed an action on its
note which had been wiped out by the
foreclosure sale and sought a deficiency for
the full amount due. The foreclosure sale
did not result in any significant money to
be applied to the subordinated note. In
fact, Heller's bid was ohly $2.00 over the
amount of the senior lien. As that case
clearly illustrates, there is a real distinction
between a junior lienor who purchases the
secured property at a senior sale and a
junior who is "sold-out".

price. [Citation.] To so limit the deficiency judgment right is consistent with the
general purpose of section 580a, viz., to
protect against a lienor buying in the property at a deflated price, obtaining a deficiency judgment, and achieving a recovery
in excess of the debt by reselling the property at a profit
[f]
The unmistakable policy of California is to prevent
excess recoveries by secured creditors.,
Bank of Hemet v. United States (9th Cir.
1981) 643 F.2d 661, 669." (Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, supra, 176
Cal.App.3d at pp. 273-274, 221 CaLRptr.
425; see also, Bank of Hemet v. United
States (9th Cir.1981) 643 F.2d 661.)
The Bank's argument to this court relies
heavily upon the decision in Roseleaf and
an earlier California case 8 which also declined to apply section 580a to a junior
lienor's efforts to secure a deficiency judgment Both cases, however, are distinguishable as neither involved a purchasing
junior lienholder.

This is a distinction that was not presented in Roseleaf. 'The junior in Roseleaf did
not purchase at the senior's sale. To apply
the fair value limitations to that junior
would result in the amount of his deficiency being limited by the amount of someone
else's bid, a factor over which he has no
control. However, once a junior chooses to
purchase, it is equitable to apply the fanvalue limitations to him. Any loss to him
as creditor by his own underbidding is
gained by him as purchaser for a bargain

Nonetheless, the Bank takes the view
that the rule of Roseleaf should apply irrespective of whether the junior was a purchaser or was simply "sold out" It somewhat cavalierly dismisses Heller as bad law
and Bank of Hemet v. United States, supra, 643 F.2d 661, as a federal case entitled
to little weight

«. Hillen v. Soulc (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d 45, 45 P.2d
349, disapproved on another point in Brown v.
Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 198-199, 259 ?2&
425.
9. However, the court in Bank of Hemet did note
that the plaintiff bank, a purchasing junior lienholder, had failed to file a deficiency action on
its unpaid indebtedness within the required
three months, thereby losing the right to seek a
deficiency judgment against its debtor. The
court nonetheless determined to apply the fair
value provisions of section 580a even though an
action for a deficiency judgment was no longer
available to the bank. As the ultimate question
in the case involved the amount of the redemption price to be paid by the United States, under
28 United States Code section 2410(d) (in order
to protect its tax lien which was junior to the
bank's encumbrance), the court had to decide
how much of the bank's debt had been satisfied

The Bank emphasizes that neither case
involved or discussed the question of the
three month limitations period9 and argues
that they stand only for the proposition
by reason of the bank's purchase at the senior
foreclosure.
The court held the fact that the bank had
purchased the secured property was dispositive
and required the application of section 580a.
The court concluded, "We reject treating the
entire debt of the Bank as an obligation 'satisfied by reason of such sale.' To the extent, if
any, the Bank's debt was eliminated by its failure to seek a deficiency judgment pursuant to
section 580a it is not possible to say that that
portion was 'satisfied by reason of such sale.'
Its destruction came about because of events
subsequent to the sale. Thus, we conclude that,
by reason of the application of section 580a to
the Bank's purchase at the foreclosure sale of
the first lienholder's security interest, the
amount of the Bank's debt 'satisfied by reason
of such sale' is the amount by which the fair
market value of the property at the time of the
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that the "fair value" provisions of section
680a apply to a purchasing junior. The
Bank urges that neither case can be read to
require that the three month limitations
period also be applied. The Bank claims
that unless the four year period in section
337 is the applicable period of limitations
the Bank will be deprived of substantial
rights because, until a resale of the property takes place (a process which here took
over a year), the amount of the deficiency
can not be determined. Finally, the bank
argues that the references in both sections
580a and 337 to an action brought within
three months after a "sale under such deed
of trust" (emphasfe added) means that the
limitation is imposed only on the Jiolder of
the deed of trust under which the foreclosure sale is being conducted.
[4,51 We reject all of these arguments.
Heller and Bank of Hemet are well reasoned decisions and reached results that
are both fair and consistent with California's strong public policy to prevent excessive recoveries by secured creditors. like
the court in Heller, we conclude that a
junior lienholder who purchases the secured property at a senior foreclosure sale
is bound by section 580a. It provides the
exclusive remedy if such junior desires to
recover a deficiency judgment following a
non-judicial foreclosure.1*
In addition, we see no reason to apply
only a portion of section 580a. As noted,
both Heller and bank of Hemet involved
sale exceeded the amount paid by the Bank for
the property at the time of the sale. This is the
'(A) portion' of the section 2410(d) redemption
price while the amount paid by the Bank for the
property of the sale is the '(B) portion.'" {Bank
of Hemet v. United States, supra, 643 F.2d at p.
670.)
10. SecUon 580d notwithstanding, a deficiency
judgment is permitted in these circumstances.
As the court held in Walter E Heller Western
Inc. v. Bloxham, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 273,
221 CaLRptr. 425. section 580d (which prohibits
a deficiency judgment following a non-judicial
foreclosure) will not be applied to bar a deficiency judgment to a junior lienor purchasing at
a senior's sale. "(T]he purpose of [section 580d]
is to create a parity of remedies available to the
foreclosing beneficiary: judicial sale with the
right to a deficiency judgment accompanied by
the debtor's right of redemption, or private sale
resulting in nonredeemable title with no right to
a deficiency. [Citation.] Although the purchas-

the application of that section's "fair value" limitations. No issue was raised in
either case as to the three month limitations period provided for in the penultimate
sentence of the section. However, the language of section 580a could not be clearer.
It states that any action for a deficiency
judgment "must be brought within three
months" of the foreclosure sale. Given the
mandate of section 580a, an action brought
more than three months after the sale, as
is the case here, is subject to dismissal as
untimely.
Nor does this result in any injustice to
the purchasing junior. There is no need
for him to await a subsequent resale on the
open market. The "fair value" provisions
of section 580a provide for a specific process of evaluation which is to take place
after the complaint is filed and is an integral part of formal pre-trial preparation.
It is that valuation, rather than any actual
subsequent sale, which will control the calculation of the claimed deficiency. Even if
an open market sale were to occur prior to
trial it would only be persuasive, not controlling, on such "fair value" determination.
Finally, we reject the Bank's contention
that section 580a is limited by its terms to
the foreclosing senior. In the context of a
purchasing junior, there is no reason to
make the distinction urged by the Bank.11
A junior lienholder effectively steps into
the shoes of the senior when he purchases
ing junior ends up with nonredeemable title, he
is not the one who elected the private sale and
had no opportunity to evaluate the desirability
of that remedy in light of his situation. It
would be unfair to eliminate the purchasing
junior's right to a deficiency based on a choice
made by the senior lienholder." (Id., at p. 273,
221 CaLRptr. 425.)
11. Indeed, section 580a, prior to its recent
amendment, used the phrase "such deed of
trust" not only in connection with the three
month limitations period, but also with respect
to the "fair value" provisions which the Bank
concedes apply to limit its deficiency claim.
The Bank offers no explanation as to why we
should conclude that such language restricts
application of the three months limitation period to the foreclosing senior, but at the same
time permits the fair value limitation to be
applied to both the senior and the purchasing
junior.
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the secured property at the senior's foreclosure. Unlike the sold-out junior the security for the payment of his debt has not
been rendered valueless, but rather he is
protected by the difference between the
fair value of the property and the amount
of the foreclosure sale price. Upon completion of the senior foreclosure sale he acquires an unredeemable title which he is
free to resell.12 To the extent that the fair
market value exceeds the amount of the
senior liens whicji were not discharged by
the foreclosure sale, the indebtedness due
the junior has been satisfied and failure to
apply section 580a could result in a double
recovery.
We thereforte conclude that the trial
court was correct in granting a nonsuit
The Bank's delay for over fourteen months
went well beyond the time mandated by
section 580a.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. McKendrick
shall recover his costs on appeal.
KLEIN, PJ., and ARABIAN, J.,
concur.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
a Corporation|
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. 890906166
JUDGE UNO

vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,

r

J-ST7-ciO-(&ncuwv

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for oral argument before
the above entitled Court on June 22, 1990 before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno.

The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff is hereby
granted judgment against defendants as follows:
1.

For Judgment in the principal sum of $26,087.71,

together with interest in the pum of $3,848.13.
2.
$3,000.00.

For a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of

The total Judgment of $32,935.84 shall bear interest at
the rate of 18% until paid in full.^_ ,
DATED this ,Q5~ day of iEwre/ 1990.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 0 East South Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100

JUL 25 1S90

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
a Corporation,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 890906166
JUDGE UNO

vs,
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for oral
argument on the 22nd day of June, 1990, before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno at the hour of 9:00 A.M.

Bryan W. Cannon appeared

for the plaintiff, and Franklin L. Slaugh appeared pro se and as
attorney for Cheryl D. Slaugh. Based upon the stipulations of fact
and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendants, Franklin and Cheryl Slaugh (Slaughs),

entered into a loan agreement with plaintiff, Associates Financial
1

Services (Associates), on or about November 26, 1982.
2.

The loan agreement included a note in the amount of

$3 3,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in the Note.
3.

The note was

secured

by

a

trust

deed

on

real

property located at 8620 South Gladiator Way, Sandy, Utah.
4.

The lien of Associates was a second mortgage on the

5.

The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage Loan

property.

Corporation (Utah Mortgage).
6.

Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into default

on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go into default on the
Associates trust deed.
7.

Because of Slaughs1 default, Utah Mortgage commenced

a non-judicial foreclosure and eventually conducted a trustee's
sale on the real property.
8.

The trustee's sale occurred on February 28, 1989.

Associates appeared at the sale and bid an amount of $26,000.00 as
the high bid.

The amount owing to Utah Mortgage was approximately

$20,000.00 at the time of the sale.
9.

The value of the real property at the time of sale

was more than $40,000.00, although the exact market value has not
been established.

2

10.

At the time of the foreclosure sale there were

unreleased federal tax liens against Slaughs which were also liens
on the real estate.
11.

The branch manager of Associates, who attended the

sale, did not actually know about the federal tax liens, although
they were of record.
12. |Associates1 file on Slaughs was in Dallas, Texas at
the time of the sale.

The file did have a copy of a title report

that identified the federal tax liens.
13.

Under federal law, the IRS has a 120-day right of

redemption on any trustee's sale when a lien is in place.

As a

result of the 120 day right of redemption, the IRS paid Associates
the sum of $2 6,000.00 within 12 0-days of the sale to cover the high
bid at sale.
14.

The IRS took title to the real property under the

redemption

and wiped

out any

interest of Associates

in the

property.

The net proceeds of the redemption to Associates was

approximately $5,700.00, which amount was applied to the account
of Slaughs to reduce the balance owing.
15.

The balance of the Note and Trust Deed, after

redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest from
September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the note.

3

16.

No payments have been made by Slaughs to Associates

since the redemption by the IRS.
17.

The Note provides for an award of attorney's fees

in the event it is necessary to enforce collection of the Note.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Associates, as a junior lien purchaser at the sale

of a senior trust deed is not bound by the Section 57-1-32, Utah
Code Annotated, 3-month right of action rule when the IRS exercises

4
a 12 0-day right of redemption.
2.

Section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated ("One-Action-

Rule") did not require Associates to first conduct a non-judicial
foreclosure before bringing its action for the balance of its debt,
since the security was lost, not through the fault of Associates,
but because of failures by Slaughs.
3.

Plaintiff, Associates, is entitled to a Judgment

against Slaughs in the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest
from and after September of 1989 pursuant to the terms of the Note
and for a reasonable attorney's fee for prosecution of this action.
DATED this 2L<± day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT:
Y^A_^^^

^ ^yCt^-r-

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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